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Few cases involving property law have engendered the level of 
concern that the Supreme Court’s recent Kelo decision spawned.1  
Despite the language of the Fifth Amendment, “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation[,]”2 
 
 *  Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, Florida State University Col-
lege of Law.  Special thanks to my colleagues Rob Atkinson, J.B. Ruhl, Jonah Gelbach, Jon 
Klick and Manuel Utset for helping me think through some of my ideas. Thanks also to the 
participants in the conference on "Takings: The Uses and Abuses of Eminent Domain and 
Land Use Regulation" for the DeVoe Moore Center and the FSU College of Law’s Program 
on Law, Economics and Business, and in particular to Bruce Benson for organizing the con-
ference, and Ilya Somin, Perry Shapiro and Rick Stroup for comments and discussions at 
that conference.    
 1.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 2.   U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Kelo held that the government can use its eminent domain power 
to take property from private owners in order to transfer that 
property to other private owners.3  For the sake of brevity, I will 
refer to the ability of government to use eminent domain to trans-
fer property between private owners as the “Kelo power.”  Local 
governments’4 use of the Kelo power creates a perception that the 
government today is acting much as the reviled Sheriff of Notting-
ham in the childhood story of Robin Hood, taking property from 
the poor to line the coffers of those who curry favor with the au-
thorities.  This perception is reinforced because the ostensible rea-
son for local governments’ exercise of their Kelo power is to in-
crease their tax bases by revitalizing run down neighborhoods that 
provide homes mainly to the less well-to-do.  The perception is fur-
ther solidified because often the recipient of the land is a large im-
personal entity, usually a corporation, which is frequently given 
tax breaks along with the property.  In return, the corporation 
promises that it will devote the land to uses that will help create 
jobs and attract other businesses and wealthier residents, whose 
property tax payments will shore up the failing tax base of the lo-
cal government entity.   
 It is therefore not surprising that Kelo has generated a host of 
citizen initiatives and state legislation restricting the use of the 
eminent domain power to transfer property from one private entity 
to another.5  Such efforts, of course, are entirely consistent with 
the rationale of Kelo itself.  In Kelo, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question whether, by including the phrase “for public use” in 
the Fifth Amendment, the Constitution prohibited the use of emi-
 
 3.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. Kelo expanded the boundaries of public use to include eco-
nomic development and increasing the local government tax base by broadly interpreting 
“public purpose” and giving great deference to local government determinations of public 
needs.  Id. at 489-90.  The Supreme Court had previously approved the use of eminent do-
main to transfer property from one private entity to another when existing ownership im-
posed direct costs on the local community, such as where one landowner exercised monopoly 
power over all land in the area or the land that was taken was a slum.  See, e.g., Haw. Hous. 
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).     
 4.  Any governmental entity with eminent domain power can exercise the Kelo 
power.  I use the term “local government” to refer to the governmental entity actually exer-
cising the Kelo power, in order to distinguish this entity from other bodies of government, 
such as state legislatures, that have the authority to limit the use of eminent domain by 
lower bodies of government, such as municipalities and counties. This usage comports with 
the reality that it is usually a local government that has exercised the power, in large part 
because it generally will have an easier time making a plausible argument that its use is 
good for its citizens than will governments that represent citizens spread out across a large 
geographical area.    
 5.  See DANA BERLINER, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A 
FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), 
available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED_report.pdf (listing new state legis-
lation); see also The Castle Coalition, http://www.castlecoalition.org (last visited Feb. 16, 
2008) (reporting grassroots movement of eminent domain abuse). 
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nent domain power to transfer property from one private entity to 
another.6  The Court essentially reasoned that the term “public 
use” was not meant to restrict the use of eminent domain to situa-
tions where the property is publicly owned, or even put directly to 
a public use.7  Implicit in the Kelo holding is the principle that it is 
up to the political processes to prevent local governments from 
abusing the power of eminent domain to enrich supporters of local 
officials responsible for the decision to take the property at issue.8  
Thus, when state-level politics limits the power of state and local 
governments to use takings to transfer private ownership, those 
limits are not only consistent with, but are actually envisioned by 
the Kelo decision.9  In essence, the Court declined the invitation to 
play the role of Robin Hood, instead stating that it was up to the 
state legislatures to do so.   
 This article provides some guidelines for how state legislatures 
might best play that role.  It suggests that a legislative response 
by state governments is warranted to prevent abuse of the Kelo 
power.10  It does so by using economic analysis to address the con-
stitutional and political issues raised by government use of the 
Kelo power.  The article focuses directly on concerns that the Kelo 
power creates an opportunity for local government to act like the 
Sheriff of Nottingham.  However, it concludes that concerns should 
not focus per se on the government-forced transfer of property from 
one private entity to another, but rather with the level of compen-
sation that the courts have demanded for takings, coupled with a 
lack of procedures, to ensure that the use of the Kelo power pro-
vides public benefits, rather than a simple wealth transfer from 
one private entity to another.   
 
 6.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.  
 7.  Id. at 479-80. In Kelo, the Court used condemnation of land for a railroad with 
common-carrier duties as an illustration of when “a State may transfer property from one 
private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking.”  Id. at 477.   
 8.  See id. at 478. 
 9.  Id. at 489  (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from 
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”). 
 10.  This article thus assumes that there is interest at least in some states for reform-
ing Kelo power use.  Ilya Somin uses classic public choice theory to contend that such inter-
est by state legislators is mostly illusory.  He has surveyed state legislative responses to 
Kelo and concluded that most will be ineffective.  See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: 
Assessing the Political Response to Kelo 14-15 (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper Se-
ries, Working Paper No. 07-14, 2007), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/ 
publications/working_papers/07-14.pdf.  His conclusion, however, is belied to some extent by 
his own admission that Pennsylvania, Michigan, Kansas (and I would add Florida) are 
states in which the Kelo power had been exercised with some regularity and that did adopt 
meaningful reform.  Id. at 12, 14.  His categorization of legislative reactions also suffers 
from failure to take into account that the courts are well aware of the public outcry from 
Kelo and are not likely to simply continue to approve use of the Kelo power just because the 
legislation leaves them that alternative.  
308  JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 23:2 
 
                                                                                                                  
 In Part II of this article, I use economics to review the potential 
benefits that can flow from the use of eminent domain to transfer 
property from one private entity to another.  In Part III, I describe 
potential Kelo power abuses. In Part IV, I discuss mechanisms that 
other scholars have suggested obviate the need for the Kelo power, 
and explain why a need for that power still remains.  In Part V, I 
propose two changes in law — one regarding compensation to own-
ers whose property is condemned using the Kelo power and the 
other regarding procedures that local governments should have to 
follow to use the Kelo power.  This section also explains how these 
legal changes would minimize the potential for abuse without for-
feiting the Kelo power altogether. In proposing these changes, I 
suggest that commentators to date have ignored procedural means 
that can harness the expertise of government officials, as well as 
incentives of potential private recipients of the property, to solve 
problems that these commentators have concluded are insur-
mountable.  
 
II. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM USE OF KELO POWER 
 
A. Efficiency Gains from Transferring Property to the Highest 
Valuing User 
 
Generally we trust private mechanisms—in particular volun-
tary agreements for purchase and sale of land—to ensure that land 
goes to the highest valuing user.11  When there are transaction 
costs that prevent transfer to the highest valuing user using such 
mechanisms,12 we want government to be able to induce transfer 
without necessarily having to own the property itself.   
Use of the Kelo power is not theoretically distinguishable from 
other uses of eminent domain with respect to efficiency gains.  If 
transfer of the property from the original owners is justified when 
the government takes title to the condemned property, it can be 
justified when the government retransfers that property to a pri-
vate entity.  According to the language of the Fifth Amendment, 
critics of the Kelo majority focus on “public use” as the key term 
 
 11.  See Gary D. Libecap & Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Contracting for Property 
Rights 15 (U. of Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 00-07, 2000), available at 
http://economics.eller.arizona.edu/downloads/working_papers/anderson3s.pdf (“With secure 
rights to land and the existence of land markets, price signals will direct land to those who 
will place it in its highest-valued use at any point in time.”). 
 12.  R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (explaining 
that in the absence of transaction costs, parties will transfer property rights to maximize 
wealth, but that transaction costs can interfere with such transfers). 
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that they claim invalidates the Kelo holding.13  But use is not 
automatically public when run by the state.14   
For example, if the state condemns land for a hospital that it 
owns and runs, the hospital only serves a select subset of the gen-
eral public (those who either cannot pay for alternative hospital 
care or prefer to use the public hospital because of convenience, the 
hospital’s resources, or any other reason).  If the state runs the 
hospital, the use of the property is per se a public use.  But if a 
private entity runs the hospital is the use any less public?  There is 
absolutely no difference in use.    
Moreover, as a matter of policy, do we want the state running 
hospitals simply because that is the only way the state could exer-
cise its eminent domain power to make construction of the hospital 
feasible?  Economists often critique government provision of ser-
vices that could be privately provided because the government op-
erates outside the competitive marketplace that induces private 
entities to meet consumer demand at the lowest cost.15  In addi-
tion, government does not have any particular expertise in run-
ning hospitals or, for that matter, most of the other projects that 
 
 13.  See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 494-523 (dissenting opin-
ions); cf. Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argu-
ment for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 495-500 
(2006) (agreeing with the dissent in Kelo that the Kelo holding effectively removed the 
phrase “for public use” from the Takings Clause, but recognizing that the holding was in 
line with precedent, thus proposing a ban on takings for development by way of state legis-
lation or constitutional amendment). 
 14.   For example, local governments often provide essentially private goods that gen-
erate external benefits, such as primary education, public transportation and garbage col-
lection. See Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a Better Future 
for Urban Communities, 36 URB. L. 1, 11-12 (2004) (noting that parks, roads and schools 
provided by local governments do not exhibit the classical public goods attributes of non-
rivalrous use and inability to exclude individuals from enjoying these services); see also 
WILLIAM B. NEENAN, URBAN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 171-75 (Curt Peoples, Jeanne Heise & Amy 
Ullrich, eds., 1981) (noting that services provided by local governments have a mixed public-
private nature).  Although such services are used by members of the public, they primarily 
benefit the individuals who use them and are not public goods in the classic economic sense 
because it is possible to exclude individuals from their use and their consumption is rival-
rous.  See, e.g., Mark Gradstein, Rent Seeking and the Provision of Public Goods, 103 ECON. 
J. 1236, n.1 (1993) (“[P]ublic goods . . . are characterised by the absence of rivalry in con-
sumption.”); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 387, 387 (1954) (“[E]ach individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtrac-
tion from any other individual’s consumption of that good.”).  Moreover, many individuals 
purchase such services from private providers, and the use of the services in those instances 
is no different from when the local government provides the service.   
 15.  See, e.g., MATTHEW MITCHELL, RIO GRANDE FOUND., THE PROS OF PRIVATELY-
HOUSED CONS: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE COST SAVINGS OF PRIVATE PRISONS (2003), 
http://www.correctionscorp.com/overview/prison_study_march18.pdf (comparing efficiency of 
private-run versus government-run prisons). See generally Timothy K. Barnekov & Jeffrey 
A. Raffel, Public Management of Privatization, 14 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 135 
(1990) (sorting through the debates for and against privatization of services and offering 
suggestions on when privatization may be a viable option). 
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have been promoted by use of the Kelo power.  
Government may be best at envisioning highest value uses and 
coordinating transfers, but it is unlikely to be best at actually 
managing the property use once the transfer is accomplished.16  
Perversely, without the Kelo power, government may be forced to 
actually own and operate the enterprise that it finds maximizes 
public wealth, even though government is unlikely to be the most 
efficient owner and operator.  The government can perhaps avoid 
this conundrum by contracting the operation of the facility to a 
private entity while continuing to own it, but government is not 
likely even to be best at exercising ownership,17 and even if it is, 
the need to separate ownership from management by government 
will create agency costs.  
 
B. Overcoming Holdout Problems 
 
Problems of effecting transfer to the highest valuing user are 
especially apt to arise when there are synergistic benefits from co-
ordinated uses of contiguous property.  The increase in wealth may 
come about because the value of the use of the whole tract of land 
may exceed the value of the sum of the individual contiguous par-
cels in current owners’ hands.  Wealth can be increased only if the 
highest valuing entity can buy up the entire tract.  That entity will 
face holdout problems that can raise the cost of purchase and per-
versely even prevent the transfer of the property entirely.18  In 
that case, the land value never increases to reflect these synergis-
tic benefits.   Eminent domain power counteracts the ability of the 
holdout to capture an unfair share of wealth increases from trans-
 
 16.  See M. Shamsul Haque, Public Service Under Challenge in the Age of Privatiza-
tion, 9 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y & ADMIN. 186 (1996) (discussing idea that critics of the 
public sector usually claim that private enterprises are more efficient because it is competi-
tive in nature, more capable of ensuring fairness and welfare and more suitable for achiev-
ing a proper allocation or distribution of resources). 
 17.  See Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP.133, 141, 
144 (1998) (asserting that private ownership of facilities that produce goods and services is 
preferable to government ownership because private owners have incentives to keep costs 
down while government officials have incentives to supply monopoly rents); see also Timo-
thy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods, 
116 Q. J. ECON. 1343, 1343-44 (2001) (concluding that government ownership is appropriate 
only when a project creates primarily public goods and the government values those goods 
more than any other entity, e.g., more than any nongovernmental organization (NGO)). 
 18.  See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124-25 
(2004); see also Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. 
ECON. 473, 474 (1976) (“Consolidation of many contiguous but separately owned parcels of 
land under one owner supposedly creates a holdout problem, with each seller having an 
incentive to hold out to be the last to settle and capture any rent accruing to the assem-
bly.”); Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, The Disunity of Unanimity, 14 CONST. POL. 
ECON. 83, 91-92 (2003).  
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fer of parcels with synergistic uses.  This is the classic economic 
defense of use of eminent domain to allow the government to take 
land for its own use.19  The thought is that the business of gov-
ernment by democratically accountable officials should not be 
thwarted by the prospect of holdouts and private strategic behav-
ior. 
In addition to the holdout problem, which creates a barrier to 
the ability of a single entity to purchase multiple land parcels to 
realize synergistic benefits, a private entity may face significant 
regulatory risks that threaten its ability to realize these benefits 
once it has acquired the property.20  Today, the development of 
multiple-use projects necessarily involves local government to 
make sure that the private entities provide sufficient infrastruc-
ture such as roads, schools, parks, and other government-provided 
goods that the ultimate users of the project will demand.  If these 
are not built, the development will tax the existing infrastructure 
and some of the project costs will be borne by the current residents 
and other taxpayers within the local government unit.  A private 
owner can proceed with a project and then negotiate with city 
planners about the requisite infrastructure it will have to provide.  
However, this creates uncertainty about the ultimate costs and 
revenues that will flow from the project.  In that situation, the 
owners’ risks will not fully realize the synergistic benefits of ag-
gregation of property and may be dissuaded from investing in the 
aggregation of the parcels in the first place.  In the extreme, local 
governments may find it expedient simply to deny approval for a 
controversial development rather than negotiate and face litigation 
over conditions it imposes.21
 
C. Accounting for External Benefits 
 
There may also be beneficial externalities from use of private 
 
 19.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40-42 (2d ed. 1977); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald 
Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 557 (1993) (stating generally that the use of eminent domain is 
to prevent holdouts); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law 4 
(Stanford L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 316, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ ab-
stract=859406 (“When . . . the state needs to assemble many contiguous parcels . . . acquisi-
tion by purchase might be stymied by hold-out problems, making the power to take socially 
advantageous.”). 
 20.  See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and 
the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 622-23 (2004) (critiquing the uncertainty 
inherent in the Supreme Court’s imposition of constitutional scrutiny on local government 
exactions from developers but not the current regime of local government control of devel-
opment through a flexible bargaining process in which comprehensive land use plans, maps, 
zoning, subdivision ordinances, and variances are all negotiable).   
 21.  See id. at 661-62. 
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property.22  Certain uses will increase neighboring property val-
ues, create job opportunities, etc.  These benefits will never be cap-
tured by any owner, but the local government is the most likely 
entity to represent the interests of neighboring property owners 
and others in the community who stand to benefit from a new land 
development project.  This is true because those benefits are re-
flected as increased property value, business revenue, or residents’ 
income, which in turn increase the tax revenue of the local gov-
ernment. 23  These benefits to local government may in turn en-
courage the government to offer incentives to land owners (such as 
property tax breaks and direct subsidies) who promise to use land 
in ways that generate such external benefits.  When the external 
benefits depend on synergies of land use of contiguous parcels that 
are not currently owned by one entity, a city may need to coordi-
nate the consolidation of property and the resulting uses to maxi-
mize the net social wealth.24  In other words, the government will 
be able to utilize its land use regulatory power to structure the 
transfer to maximize wealth, including the external benefits that 
the private owner otherwise would not be able to realize. 
 
D. An Example of the Potential Benefits of the Kelo Power 
 
Consider two contiguous parcels of land, owned by O1 and O2 
respectively.  The market value of each parcel is $50,000; the value 
to O1 of his parcel is $100,000 and the value to O2 of his parcel is 
$100,000.  Suppose that the value of the parcels to any one of a 
multitude of potential buyers is not great individually, but because 
of synergies in uses of the parcels, the value is $300,000 if a poten-
tial buyer can buy the entire tract of two parcels.  Efficiency is best 
served by having the parties negotiate the sale of each parcel to 
the prospective buyer.  The price would fall between $100,000 and 
$150,000 per parcel, assuming that the transaction costs of imple-
 
 22.  See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 32, 751 
(15th ed. 1995) (discussing externalities generally). 
 23.  See Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for 
Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1854 (2005); see also Matthew L. Cypher 
& Fred A. Forgey, Eminent Domain: An Evaluation Based on Criteria Relating to Equity, 
Effectiveness, and Efficiency, 39 URB. AFF. REV. 254, 263 (2003)  (“One of the arguments 
made in favor of using eminent domain for the redevelopment of an area is that unproduc-
tive land would be put to its highest and best use, which would ultimately result in an in-
creased property tax base.”). 
 24.  “[A] situation could arise in which the private benefit of the taking is lower than 
the actual value of the properties to all of the existing owners, but the social benefit of the 
taking is greater than the actual value to the existing owners.” Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public 
Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and 
Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42 (2006). 
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menting the sale and transfer are negligible.  However, each of the 
owners has an incentive to demand $200,000 for his parcel, as that 
would still allow the transaction to occur, but would give the owner 
who gets this price to keep all the surplus created by the transfer.  
If each owner asks for $200,000, though, the buyer will not pay the 
price, and the efficient transfer does not occur.  In a situation like 
this, the local government can force the transfer by using its Kelo 
power. 
Suppose instead that the potential buyer values the entire 
tract at only $180,000, but that the city gains tax revenues, local 
businesses increase profits, and the value of neighboring land in-
creases if ownership of the tract is transferred and put to its new 
use.  Suppose further that all three increases in social wealth, 
added together, total $120,000.  Assuming that the potential own-
ers cannot extract this added value from the neighbors, the trans-
fer will not take place voluntarily even though the transfer is effi-
cient.  Hence, we would hope that the municipality would obtain 
the land and transfer it to one of the highest valuing users to se-
cure the increase in social wealth for the community.   Again, if the 
local government runs into a holdout problem, it can use its Kelo 
power.   
 
III. ABUSES OF KELO POWER: ROBBING FROM THE POOR TO GIVE TO 
THE RICH 
 
The Kelo power can be seen as use of government power to 
transfer wealth from one set of individuals (who for the most part 
have little political influence because they do not generate benefits 
such as tax revenues for the city), to others who, as potential own-
ers or developers of a large multi-use project, are likely to have 
more power to influence local officials.25  Because developers stand 
to gain substantially from the transfer of property, such developers 
have an incentive to seek out and even create the opportunities for 
 
 25.  See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 977 (2003) (“[T]he available evidence strongly suggests that pri-
vate parties standing to benefit from an exercise of eminent domain frequently exert politi-
cal pressure on the condemning government.”); see also Saul Levmore, Just Compensation 
and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306-11 (1990) (contending that compensation re-
quirements distinguish between interest groups who do not need the protection of judicially-
imposed just compensation, and the individual who is involved once in a lifetime when his 
property is taken, and for whom organizing to participate in the political marketplace would 
be highly inefficient); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 
1333, 1358-60 (1991) (arguing that government impositions on private owner’s use of prop-
erty are compensable as takings when the beneficiaries of the imposition are special interest 
groups capable of capturing the political process, and those who bear the burden are singled 
out and unable to compete effectively in the political process). 
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such projects26 —that is to rent seek.27  They can then use some 
portion of the rents they garner to provide political support for in-
cumbent local officials.  Reciprocally, because those whose property 
is taken do not have significant political clout, officials do not bear 
the costs of the wealth transfer from these individuals to the offi-
cials’ influential supporters.  Hence, there are no incentives to pre-
vent transfer of land from a higher to lower valuing user.   
This can be illustrated using the example above.  Just compen-
sation under eminent domain law is market value.28  Hence, if the 
local government uses its Kelo power, it will pay only $100,000 for 
the tract of land.  Suppose the value of the land when aggregated 
(including synergistic value) to the highest valuing user other than 
O1 and O2 is $170,000. Then the city has an incentive to condemn 
the land and sell it for somewhere between $100,000 and $170,000.  
But such a transfer of land would not be efficient or fair.  It would 
decrease the total value of the land from $200,000 to $170,000.29  
It would also deprive each of the existing owners of $50,000 of the 
value that they place on the land because they would only receive 
market value.   
Even if condemnation with just compensation does not de-
crease the wealth of original land owners, it may provide unde-
served benefit to the property recipient by allowing the recipient to 
keep the value created by synergistic benefits.30  If the benefits re-
sult from synergies in land use alone, rather than from particular 
capabilities of the entity that ends up owning the entire tract of 
 
 26.  For example, if a developer  
can get local government officials to decide that the business he is going 
to establish on the land is in the ‘public interest’ because it will generate 
employment in the community and increase the tax base . . . [h]e negoti-
ates with the local officials, who decide to condemn the land and sell it to 
him . . . well below its market value.   
Bruce L. Benson, The Mythology of Holdout as a Justification for Eminent Domain and Pub-
lic Provision of Roads, 10 INDEP. REV. 165, 173 (2005).   
 27.  Rent seeking is the “behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts to 
maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus.”  James M. Buchanan, 
Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 4 
(James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980). 
 28.  “Just compensation includes all elements of value that inhere in the property, but 
it does not exceed market value fairly determined.”  Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 
255 (1934). 
 29.  The inefficiency of market value as a measure for just compensation has long 
been noted.  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 183 (1985); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Cove-
nants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 735-37 
(1973).   
 30.  Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 579 (2001) 
(“While people can view windfalls that befall another with sanguinity, when the windfall 
arrives as a result of a strategic and deliberate decision of the government, the reaction may 
turn to resentment and frustration.”). 
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property, then those benefits result from the government’s ability 
to facilitate the consolidating transfer of property.  Therefore the 
benefits should belong to the government entity that exercises 
eminent domain.  Otherwise, the private recipient receives a wind-
fall from the property transfer.31   
Those distrustful of government might object, stating that the 
surplus would be better used if placed in the hands of private enti-
ties.  However, other mechanisms by which government might 
raise revenue, such as taxes, are economically distorting and 
therefore impose a net loss of social value,32 while this mechanism 
actually corrects economic distortions that result from strategic 
behavior of land owners.  Hence, even those who do not support 
increasing government’s ability to raise revenue should recognize 
that the use of the Kelo power to collect the value of property ag-
gregation is preferable to other revenue generating mechanisms.  
They might also argue that allowing the private transferee to keep 
the surplus would create incentives for private entities to identify 
areas that are currently devoted to uses other than maximization 
of the land value.  As I explain below, however, it is unlikely that 
such incentives are necessary because such opportunities will ei-
ther be easily identified based on public information, or known to 
local officials who have an incentive to exploit them on behalf of 
local government.  
The Kelo power’s ability to move land to its highest valued use, 
even in the presence of externalities, can best be illustrated with a 
variant on our previous example.  Suppose now that the market 
value of each parcel is $100,000 and that both O1 and O2 put this 
value on the parcel each owns.  Suppose further that, again due to 
synergistic uses, the value of the entire tract is $300,000.  Now the 
use of Kelo power will not decrease the value of the land.  In fact, if 
the local government transfers the tract to an entity that values it 
at $300,000, the use of the Kelo power would not be unfair to O1 or 
O2, as they will each receive their value for the land and, and the 
taking leads to an efficient outcome.  But, there is still the ques-
tion of who gets the $100,000 surplus.   Since the surplus is cre-
ated by the ability of the local government to force consolidation of 
the parcels, the value should belong to the local government (i.e., 
go to benefit the residents of the entity exercising the eminent do-
main power).  But for agency costs that local residents incur to 
control local officials, granting the surplus to the local government 
 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  See Martin Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86 J. POL. 
ECON. S29 (1978). 
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would encourage efficient consolidation.  But, because there are 
such agency costs, Kelo does nothing to ensure that that the local 
government keeps this surplus.  In fact, public choice theory would 
predict that local government officials will transfer it to some pri-
vate entity that can best deliver votes at the next election33 or, if 
the officials responsible for exercise of the Kelo power are not 
elected, to some entity that is likely to provide a benefit to them 
such as future employment.34  If we relax the assumption that 
every entity that can use the tract values it equally, then there is a 
high probability that local officials will transfer the property (and 
with it the surplus in value created by consolidation) not to the 
highest valuing user, but instead to the user who can do the most 
for the local official (e.g. the quintessential official’s brother-in-
law).35  
Of course, if there is an entity that is a unique highest valuing 
user, then that entity should get the land and should be able to 
keep the part of the surplus that results from its unique ability to 
maximize property value.  Thus in our running example, suppose 
that the best use of the land is as a mixed-use development that 
includes homes of various values, stores for the residents of those 
homes, and some heavier commercial uses that provide jobs for 
many of the residents of the new development.  Suppose further 
that there is one developer, Dbest, who has a reputation for creativ-
ity in design of such mixed-use developments and, because of this 
creativity, can create a development worth $400,000 on the tract.  
We would want the local government to use its Kelo power to 
transfer the land to Dbest.  But local officials may instead want to 
transfer the land to a proverbial brother-in-law, or more likely, to 
some entity that will support and contribute money to their reelec-
tion.36  The land will end up worth $300,000, representing a loss of 
 
 33.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 63, 106 (1990) (“Public choice theory suggests that . . . [t]hrough highly effective 
lobbying, [interest] groups purchase the legislation they want . . . .”); see also Garnett, supra 
note 25, at 977 and accompanying quote.  
 34.    Concerns about capture of officials not subject to direct electoral accountability 
were at the heart of James Landis’s critique of the administrative state during the latter 
part of his career.  See JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESI-
DENT-ELECT (1960),  available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1960/1960_ 
1221_Landis_report.pdf (warning of "the subtle but pervasive methods pursued by regulated 
industries to influence regulatory agencies by social favors, promises of later employment in 
the industry itself, and other similar means.").   
 35.  See Shleifer, supra note 17, at 141 (“Governments throughout the world have long 
directed benefits to their political supporters, whether in the form of jobs at above-market 
wages or outright transfers.”). 
 36.  See Garnett, supra note 25, at 977; see also James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient 
Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1309-10 n.187 
(1985) (“[I]nefficient takings . . .  result from the weakness of the political check on the use 
of eminent domain: the corruption, unfairness, or mistakes of elected officials and the elec-
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the $100,000 surplus that would be created if Dbest got the parcel.  
Hence, government discretion to give the land away after it is 
taken often will lead to inefficient land transfers.   
Past use of the Kelo power to promote redevelopment has high-
lighted a third abuse of the power, albeit one that stems from local 
officials failing to protect their own political interests in seeing the 
project to fruition.  In many instances, the putative recipient of the 
property, who is expected to build a facility that will provide jobs 
that ultimately will drive demand for the use of the property, and 
perhaps to build other infrastructure, simply decides not to follow 
through with the plans.  Takings law, which is geared primarily 
toward the transfer of land to a government entity, provides no 
mechanism to ensure that these putative recipients make good on 
their implicit promises once the land is transferred to the private 
entity. 37  Knowing this, private entities have an incentive to over-
state the public benefits that their proposed projects will create, 
increasing the probability that the local government will transfer 
land to them, and providing a windfall to these entities without 
any concomitant obligation to proceed as planned.38   
 
IV. THE NEED FOR KELO POWER — PROBLEMS WITH ALTERNATIVES 
TO SOLVING THE HOLDOUT PROBLEM 
 
The fact that the Kelo power can be, and maybe is even likely 
to be abused in itself does not imply that the power is not benefi-
cial in some contexts.  Rather, if we use efficiency as our normative 
criteria for decisions regarding the use of this power, then justifi-
cation will hinge on the costs of using the power compared to the 
costs of alternatives that might also alleviate the holdout prob-
lem.39
 
A. Secret Purchases of Parcels 
 
One alternative is the creation of fictitious entities to hide both 
the identity of the buyer and the fact that one entity is trying to 
 
torate’s failure to effectively or fairly review the actions of its representatives.”). 
 37.  See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings 
after Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 192-96 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_ 
id=874865. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, The Paradox of Public Use: The Law 
and Economics of Kelo v. New London, 14 CONN. ECON. 4, 4-6 (2006) (explaining that the 
holdout problem is a justification for using eminent domain, assuming that the social bene-
fits of the project exceed the social costs). 
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buy up an entire set of contiguous parcels.40  Secret purchase of 
the parcels attempts to solve the holdout problem by denying sell-
ers information that there is synergistic value they can capture by 
holding out.  Several commentators have posited that government 
must operate in the sunshine and cannot hide its identity when it 
seeks to consolidate various land parcels.41  Hence, the eminent 
domain power makes sense for transfers of private property to the 
public domain.  But some of these same commentators contend 
that private entities, being under no constraint against employing 
secret agents, can use the mechanism to solve the holdout problem, 
and therefore do not need eminent domain power to buy the par-
cels they wish to consolidate.42   
The secret-agent-as-buyer solution works only so long as no one 
can glean that an entity seeks the entire set of parcels.  Even if the 
buyer hides its identity with respect to each purchase, in order to 
purchase all the parcels the buyer will eventually have to take the 
initiative to approach those who have not put their property on the 
market.  This will tip off perceptive observers that someone is 
really interested in parcels in the area, and eventually will reveal 
the plans of the buyer, which in turn will encourage holdouts.  
Hence, use of fictitious entities will delay the holdout problem and 
thereby potentially decrease the number of holdouts, but it will not 
eliminate the problem entirely.  Eventually, some current owners 
are likely to discern the buyer’s intent, even if not perfectly, and 
will try to capture some of the synergistic value for themselves. 
An example in which a private entity successfully purchased 
 
 40.  Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 81 
(1986) (“[R]eal estate developers and others are frequently able to assemble such parcels by 
using buying agents, option agreements, straw transactions, and the like.”). 
 41.  See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 24, at 19-22; William A. Fischel, The Political Economy 
of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Do-
main, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929, 950 (2004) (“Unlike private developers of such activities . 
. . community planning must take place in the open, and holdouts will be far more problem-
atic.”). As Thomas Merrill stated,  
[A]lthough buying agents, option agreements and straw transactions 
may work well for private developers, it is unclear whether government 
can use these devices effectively.  The necessary ingredient of these 
techniques is secrecy, and governments, at least in an open society like 
the United States, are not very good at keeping secrets. 
Merrill, supra note 40, at 82. 
 42.  Although a government entity may have a harder time keeping a prospective land 
acquisition hidden than would a private entity, it may also have more power to punish hold-
outs.  For example, if owners in a residential neighborhood that is slated to be redeveloped 
to increase the tax base refuse to sell, the local government might decide that the land, if 
not redeveloped, is most suited for industrial use and rezone the land, thereby imposing the 
noise, grime, traffic, etc., that goes along with an industrial area on the recalcitrant resi-
dents.  As my colleague, Manuel Utset, remarked when we discussed this punitive power, 
the notion that local government has such power is captured in the classic joke that a per-
son might suddenly find that his house is on a one-way, dead-end street.     
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many small parcels to aggregate them for a larger project is Dis-
ney’s purchase of land for Disney World in Orlando, Florida.43   In 
1964 Disney began the process of purchasing the land through 
agents without revealing its identity as the true purchaser.44  At 
that time, it paid about $80 per acre.45  By May of 1965, it had pur-
chased about 9,000 acres for $1.5 million (about $165 per acre), 
and suspicion was aroused that some big company was behind the 
purchase of the land.46  By June of 1965, Disney had purchased 
most of the 27,000 acres of land it planned on using, but the price 
it had to pay for the land had risen.  At that time, a newspaper re-
porter revealed her suspicion that Disney was the true buyer,47 
and the price of land jumped to $80,000 per acre as sellers recog-
nized the value of the land to Disney.48
All in all, Disney bought 27,443 acres of land for an average 
price of $185 per acre.49  Although this turned out to be a good deal 
for Disney, as the creation of Disney World has made the land 
worth much more than the $5 million Disney paid for it,50 the fact 
remains that Disney had to pay more than double the initial mar-
ket value of the property.51  Moreover, the land Disney bought was 
essentially swampland,52 and not an inner city neighborhood 
where a sudden interest, even by seemingly different individuals, 
in buying unlisted parcels will quickly signal that the land is being 
used for some big project.  Had the increase in the value of the 
land been less, and had the signal that a private buyer essentially 
 
 43.  Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers to Amass Land Stage for King-
dom, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K2. 
 44.  See T. D. Allman, The Theme-Parking, Megachurching, Franchising, Exurbing, 
McMansioning of America: How Walt Disney Changed Everything, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, 
March 2007, available at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0703/feature4/; see also 
Wade Sampson, Emily Bavar Spills the Beans, MOUSE PLANET, Oct. 4, 2006, http://www. 
mouseplanet.com/articles.php?art=ww061004ws (“Beginning in 1964, Disney through a 
variety of dummy corporations quietly began buying large tracts of land, sparking specula-
tion about the identity of the mystery buyer.”). 
 45.  J. Dave Harris, Toward Improved Visualization of Unstructured Information, 
Mar. 4, 2005, http://www7.nationalacademies.org/bms/Dave_Harris.ppt; Orlando Vacation 
Guide: Walt Disney World, http://www.o-towninfo.com/Attractions/Full_Day_Parks/Walt_ 
Disney_World/walt_disney_world.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2008). 
 46.  Harris, supra note 45. 
 47.  Emily Bavar, Is Our “Mystery” Industry Disney?, Oct. 21, 1965, in Wade Sampson, 
Emily Bavar Spills the Beans, MOUSE PLANET, Oct. 4, 2006, http://www.mouseplanet.com/ 
articles.php?art=ww061004ws. 
 48.  Harris, supra note 45.  
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See A History of the Walt Disney World Resort, http://www.disneyworldtrivia.com 
/trivia/wdwhistory.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 51.  One might argue that the increased price reflects that later sellers placed a 
greater subjective value on the land than those who sold early at close to market value.  The 
nature of the land, however, suggests that landowners had no significant subjective value in 
it.  See Allman, supra note 44.  
 52.  Id.   
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sought all contiguous property in the area been identified earlier, 
there is a chance that strategic behavior and the potential for 
holdouts could have scuttled the Disney project.  
Another example often used to show that private entities can 
overcome hold out problems is Harvard University’s secret pur-
chase of land in the Allston neighborhood in Boston.  Harvard used 
an agent to purchase fifty-two acres on its behalf for $88 million.53  
In 1997, when Harvard revealed that it had purchased the land, 
some local residents and politicians complained that Harvard had 
used dirty tricks by not revealing that it was the buyer of the 
property.54  Harvard defended its right against paying a premium 
to strategic holdouts who might ask for unreasonable sums for 
their land knowing that a rich entity like Harvard had plans to 
buy property in the area.55  Given the urban setting for this secre-
tive purchase, one might conclude that this example undermines 
my point that use of agents is of limited value due to signaling.    
In fact, the details of Harvard’s purchase demonstrate that it 
does not undermine my point, and in fact some of Harvard’s later 
statements about this purchase support the point.  Harvard pur-
chased fourteen separate parcels, all but one of which were com-
mercial or industrial, as they came on the market over a seven-
year period.56  Hence, the signal that the market might have per-
ceived was much weaker than had Harvard needed to buy a larger 
number of small, residential parcels over a shorter period of time 
or if Harvard had needed its agent to approach parcel owners who 
had not put their land up for sale.  Even in the context of the se-
cret Allston purchases, savvy  residents in Allston were aware that 
someone was buying up all the available commercial real estate in 
the area; they just did not know who or why.57  Thus, even with 
the secret purchases, Harvard probably paid some premium on the 
purchases demanded by strategic sellers.58   
Most interestingly, Harvard later had to defend its purchase, 
 
 53.  Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Reveals Secret Purchases of 52 Acres Worth 
$88M in Allston, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1997, at A1. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.; see also Sara Rimer, Some Seeing Crimson at Harvard ‘Land Grab’, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 1997, at A16. 
 56.  Cassidy & Aucoin, supra note 53; Editorial, A Bum Rap in Allston, BOSTON HER-
ALD, June 12, 1997, at 34.  
 57.  Cassidy & Aucoin, supra note 53. 
 58.  Harvard’s agent reported that owners of some parcels adjacent to parcels it pur-
chased offered to sell their parcels, but the agent turned these offers down because the price 
the owners were asking was too high.  Id.  The fact that these owners approached the agent, 
rather than vice versa, and asked a price that the agent considered higher than justified, 
provides some support for the conclusion that some owners were increasing property prices 
strategically. 
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not only to some irate members of the public, but to its own Uni-
versity community.  In doing so, it essentially conceded that ex-
pansion in Cambridge would have been preferable, but noted, 
“[s]ince most of the campus in Cambridge is surrounded by resi-
dential neighborhoods, and displacement of those neighborhoods 
was not in the university’s interests or in the realm of possibility, it 
was necessary to look to other places.”59  Although Harvard never 
disclosed what rendered the purchase of sufficient contiguous resi-
dential parcels in Cambridge impossible, the difficulty of purchas-
ing the parcels anonymously is certainly a strong possibility.   
 
B. Options and Auctions to Purchase the Parcels 
 
Use of an option is another strategy that can help defeat the 
holdout problem.60   If there is more than one suitable parcel, the 
entity seeking land can purchase options on multiple parcels.61  
That entity can then choose to exercise the option to purchase the 
tracts that will allow it to obtain the needed property at the lowest 
cost, taking away existing landowners incentives to capture wealth 
by holding out.  Options will only work if there is at least one suit-
able alternative parcel and, even then, the entity seeking land will 
need to negotiate and pay for the options.  Put another way, costs 
of the option approach include the cost of potentially locating in a 
less than ideal location and the cost of negotiating and implement-
ing the options. 
In addition, the existence of one alternative may not be suffi-
cient to deter strategic behavior entirely.  If one parcel-owner at 
each site decides that it is worth gambling for the huge payoff that 
may go to a holdout, rather than accepting a price that is only 
slightly more than the value of the parcel to him, then the pur-
chaser will still have a holdout problem, only at the option stage. 
Of course, the purchaser can play each holdout against the other, 
 
 59.  Lewis Rice, Cambridge v. Allston, HARV. L. BULL., (Summer 2002) (quoting Kathy 
Spiegelman, Associate Vice President for Planning and Real Estate, Harvard University) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/alumni/bulletin/2002/summer/  
feature_1-1.html. 
 60.  See Coleman Woodbury, Land Assembly for Housing Developments, 1 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 214 (1934) (asserting that the traditional method of land assembly is 
to start by securing options); see also Merrill, supra note 40, at 81 and accompanying quote; 
Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development 
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1027 (2004) (“A second 
mechanism by which developers can prevent holdout problems without recourse to eminent 
domain is by means of ‘precommitment’ strategies.”). 
 61.  Woodbury, supra note 60, at 214 (“[T]his method consists of quietly securing op-
tions on as much of the area to be acquired as possible, often in the name of different per-
sons and of dummy corporations.”). 
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but this will signal to each that they have the potential to strike it 
rich if they maintain an asking price above the actual value they 
place on their parcel.62  
When there are multiple sites that are almost equally good for 
its project, a likely buyer can also try to use an auction to prevent 
holdouts.63  An auction at which the buyer agrees to pay the lowest 
asking price bid for all the parcels for any one of the alternative 
sites, however, is problematic because it encourages sellers to bid 
strategically, asking a price above their true value for the property 
but low enough, in their estimation, not to cause the buyer to re-
ject the site that includes their parcel.64  Economists have shown 
that bidders can be induced to reveal their true value by use of a 
second price auction, one in which a buyer agrees to pay the own-
ers of the alternative with the lowest bid, the price asked by the 
owners of the alternative with the second lowest bid.65  It is not 
clear whether this mechanism will work when the buyer is seeking 
property that is owned by several individuals, and it is the total of 
all their bids that is crucial.  Assuming that owners reveal their 
true values in a second price auction, the price paid for the prop-
erty in aggregate will, by definition of the second price mechanism, 
be greater than the value of the land to the owners.  This leaves a 
question about how the owners of the property will divide the sur-
plus that the buyer offers them together, which reintroduces the 
potential for holdouts.  
 
 
 62.  Essentially, if there is one potential buyer with holdouts for each of the two alter-
native sites, the situation is a monopsonist trying to buy in an oligopoly market.  If negotia-
tion is not costless and takes time, and there is a deadline by which the monopsonist needs 
to make the purchase, then there is some chance that one of the holdouts will capture some 
rent from strategic action.  A potential purchaser might try to set up a “voting” mechanism 
to play parcel owners against each other to get them to reveal the true values they place on 
their parcels (e.g., the price they would ask for their parcels aside from strategic behavior to 
try to capture surplus).  See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman & Gordon Tullock, A New and Supe-
rior Process for Making Social Choices, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1145 (1976) (describing the process 
by which individuals are motivated to reveal their public good preferences).  But such 
mechanisms rely on a penalty that any voter who flips the decision about which land to use 
pays to those harmed by the flip, and that penalty mechanism will not work if the parcel 
owners ultimately get paid according to the value they claim they derive from the outcome 
for which they vote (i.e. for the value of the land that they claim).  See id. at 1148-50.   
 63.  See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 
699, 701 (1987) (“An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining 
resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants.”). 
 64.  Id. at 726 (“[T]he choice of bids reflects individuals’ strategic attempts to manipu-
late the selling price, so that the quantity and price interval reached are not necessarily 
those of the competitive equilibrium.”). 
 65.  See Stephen A. Smith & Michael H. Rothkopf, Simultaneous Bidding with a 
Fixed Charge if Any Bid is Successful, 33 OPERATIONS RES. 28, 30 (1985) (“‘Second price 
auctions,’ [are] those in which the highest bid wins, but the bidder pays the amount of the 
second highest bid.”).  
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C. Precommitment Strategies 
 
Private entities might use a precommitment strategy to avoid 
the holdout problem. If the value of each parcel is the same, the 
entity desiring to purchase a group of contiguous parcels can con-
dition the purchase of any parcel on the purchase of all, and offer 
the same  price for every parcel.66  Thus, a holdout knows that he 
will not get anything above what other parcel owners receive.   
There are, however, some significant problems with this strat-
egy. The first problem is that precommitment must be done pub-
licly to work.  That is, the purchaser must acknowledge its interest 
in buying the entire tract, which will encourage all potential sell-
ers to try to capture the surplus from the project.  The second prob-
lem is that, in the real world, each parcel will not be worth the 
same value to each owner.  The third problem is that there is noth-
ing to stop a holdout from refusing to agree to the price, essentially 
asking the buyer to go back to the other sellers and agree to modify 
their contracts to allow the sale to happen, which brings the buyer 
back to free rider problem.  Together these problems imply that 
the purchaser will have to offer a price that will be acceptable to 
every parcel owner.   
Even without a holdout problem, to be successful a purchaser 
will have to price every parcel at the premium that meets the sub-
jective valuation of the most demanding landowner.67  In essence, 
precommitment avoids holdouts only by forfeiting a premium to 
those who do not place significant subjective value on the land.  If, 
in addition to having owners who place different values on the par-
cels, the parcels are not similar in terms of their inherent traits 
 
 66.   
One common practice is the use of the so-called ‘precommitment’ con-
tract, whereby a developer signs contracts with all potential sellers in a 
targeted area, promising to pay each owner the same price. As a negoti-
ating strategy, this allows the developer to argue convincingly that he 
cannot pay a substantially higher price to a holdout without incurring 
ruinous expenses in the form of higher payments that would thereby be 
owed to every other seller.  
Cohen, supra note 13, at 568.  See also Somin, supra note 37, at 208-09; Donald J. Kochan, 
“Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspec-
tive, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 88-90 (1998).  Kochan contends that because precommitment 
works in the context of tender offers for corporations, it is a proven mechanism for overcom-
ing holdouts, and Somin merely cites Kochan for support that precommitment can overcome 
holdout problems in amassing parcels of land.  Neither seriously addresses the problems 
raised for precommitment strategies by the facts that parcels of land are not identical and 
have subjective value. Nor does Kochan address the fact that a buyer of stock essentially 
gains control by purchasing a controlling percentage of shares, and the only holdout the 
buyer needs to worry about is an existing controlling shareholder.    
 67.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 183-84 (noting that parcel owners should be 
compensated for subjective value of their land).  
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(e.g., they have different geographical features or locations that 
objectively would change their value), then the purchaser must 
specify the factors on which it bases its different offers for the 
various parcels.  This may be perceived by a parcel owner as unfair 
and sour his willingness to negotiate at all if he finds that these 
factors do not capture the attributes of the land that he considers 
valuable.  For these reasons, it is not surprising that the literature 
cites no examples of private entities using precommitment strate-
gies to amass large areas of land from numerous contiguous par-
cels.   
 
D. Bottom Line on Whether the Kelo Power May Promote Efficient 
Land Transfers 
 
Analysis of the alternatives to eminent domain manifests that 
whether Kelo power is an efficient way to transfer land from one 
set of private owners to another depends on whether it will be 
abused,68 as well as empirical questions about the costs of imple-
menting the alternatives compared with the cost of implementing 
eminent domain plus the costs of abuses of eminent domain. The 
goal for state legislatures should be first to discourage local gov-
ernments from using the Kelo power when the resulting property 
transfer will be inefficient or unfair, and second to provide an effi-
cient mechanism for providing compensation to those whose prop-
erty is taken even when the resulting transfer is welfare-
increasing.    
 
V. CONDITIONS ON KELO POWER TO RETAIN BENEFITS BUT   
AVOID ABUSES 
 
If state legislatures are to enable local governments to use the 
Kelo power to facilitate efficient property transfers without em-
powering them to abuse the power, they will have to address three 
issues.  First, local governments will have to pay an owner whose 
property is taken the full value of the property to him — the re-
serve price at which he would voluntarily sell the property absent 
strategic behavior.  I will refer to this value as the idiosyncratic 
value of the current parcel owner, recognizing that it will include 
some objectively determinable value, such as the opportunity cost 
of the owner having to move, and some subjective value, such as 
 
 68.  See Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: The Abuse of Eminent Domain, 
CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4420 (“Power 
without any checks inevitably leads to abuse, and eminent domain is certainly no excep-
tion.”). 
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the owner’s particular attachment to the property.   Second, local 
governments should have to engage in something comparable to an 
auction when transferring the property to a private entity to en-
sure that the property goes to the entity that maximizes the net 
social value of the property.  Finally, the procedures for imple-
menting the use of the Kelo power should be sufficiently efficient 
so that they are cheaper than the transaction costs private entities 
would incur using alternative means to aggregate the necessary 
parcels for their projects without use of eminent domain.   
 
A. Recognition of Existing Owners’ Idiosyncratic Value 
 
Currently, the constitutional doctrine of eminent domain pro-
vides that owners receive market value as just compensation un-
der the Fifth Amendment for any property that the government 
has taken.69  The value to the individual owners will often exceed 
the market value.70 When it does, the local government may have 
an incentive to transfer property to an owner that puts it to a use 
that generates a total value that is less than the value to the cur-
rent owners, which is an inefficient outcome. This can be avoided 
by changing compensation to provide owners their idiosyncratic 
value.71  Although state legislatures cannot change the just com-
pensation requirement imposed by the Constitution because mar-
ket value is a lower bound on idiosyncratic value, these legisla-
tures can demand that local governments pay the greater idiosyn-
cratic value without running afoul of constitutional doctrine. 
Idiosyncratic value, however, cannot be determined as easily or 
 
 69.  Market value under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment is defined by case 
law as “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.” United States v. Miller, 
317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). 
 70.  Nathan Burdsal, Just Compensation and the Seller’s Paradox, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 
79, 84 (2005) (“Empirical evidence supports the contention that the fair market value fails 
to justly compensate landowners. Specifically, the disparity between the ‘fair market’ value 
and the jury award or negotiated settlement — presumably based on what a jury or arbitra-
tor believe the fair market value to be — is often very large.”). 
 71.  Others have recognized this problem and also proposed that owners be paid their 
subjective value for takings that are especially prone to give rise to inefficient property 
transfers.  See James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
859, 867 (“[J]ust compensation is adjusted upwards in specific ways as the use of con-
demned property moves from classic public use to possible public ruse to naked transfer.”); 
Merrill, supra note 40, at 90-93 (proposing that parcel owners be compensated at 150% of 
the market value for land with high subjective value); cf. Merrill, supra note 40, at 84 (advo-
cating that courts scrutinize takings of property with high subjective values, because inade-
quacy of compensation will give signals to condemnors that might lead them to move prop-
erty to a lower valued use).  Nicole Garnett has argued that owners already are compen-
sated at above market value to provide them with some of their idiosyncratic value, but that 
for takings that transfer land to private entities, compensation is still insufficient to cover 
“noninstrumental” losses.  Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Emi-
nent Domain, 105 MICH.  L. REV. 101, 148 (2006).  
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perfectly as market value.72  In the context of determining com-
pensation for takings, every parcel owner has an incentive to claim 
that the value of the property to her is greater than it really is.  
But, tort systems frequently deal with issues of subjective value, 
for example, when they award damages for pain and suffering.  
Such determinations are based on decision-makers determining 
the factors that bear on injuries that are unique to the plaintiff, 
and then deciding how much money they think would compensate 
for those injuries.  In essence, the subjective value determination 
is reduced to an objective determination of a reasonable value at-
tributable to one in the plaintiff’s position.  The same technique 
can be used to determine subjective value of property.73   
The Supreme Court has held that a person whose property is 
condemned does not have a federal constitutional right to a jury 
trial to determine just compensation,74 but many states provide 
such a right by statute or state constitution.75  Nonetheless, juries 
may not be the best mechanism for determining subjective value.  
Depending on who is actually on a particular jury, the determina-
tion of reasonable value will vary greatly from case to case.76  This 
impedes the local government from accurately estimating how 
much it will have to pay for property taken under the Kelo power, 
essentially imposing risk which can unduly discourage use of the 
power.  In addition, doctors and medical insurers claim that jury 
awards of subjective value, or at least pain and suffering, tend to 
be inflated.77  If compensation is greater than actual value to a 
parcel owner whose property was taken, the owner receives a 
 
 72.  See John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 783, 812 (2006) (“The two most serious problems with awarding compensation accord-
ing to an owner's subjective value have to do with unreasonable and unverified subjective 
values.”). 
 73.  Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation of Future Interests: 
Empirical Evidence on the Failure of Fair Market Value, 1989 BYU L. REV. 789, 799 (1989) 
(“If juries are permitted to decide questions as nebulous as mental anguish and pain and 
suffering, they should be allowed to determine a ‘fair’ condemnation award.”). 
 74.  See United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18 (1970) (“[T]here is no constitu-
tional right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(h)(2)(A) 
(In eminent domain under federal law, when a party has requested a jury to determine just 
compensation, a court may instead appoint a commission to determine just compensation 
“because of the character, location, or quantity of the property to be condemned or for other 
just reasons.”). 
 75.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 213.54 (2007); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; ILL. CONST. 
art. I, § 15.    
 76.  Thus, the main scholarly critique of jury awards of subjective harms, such as pain 
and suffering, appears to be that the awards are arbitrary.  See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, Due 
Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 
338-39 (2006).
 77.  See Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson II & Kara MacKillop, "Judicial Hellholes:" 
Medical Malpractice Claims, Verdicts and the "Doctor Exodus" in Illinois, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1309, 1312 (2006).
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windfall.  Moreover, such excessive compensation awards will dis-
courage efficient use of the Kelo power, as the government will de-
cline to transfer land to users who value it more than the current 
owners but less than the compensation the government would 
have to pay.  Finally, jury trials are a notoriously time and labor-
intensive means of fact finding.  Because the evidence that will 
bear on idiosyncratic value is, almost by definition, unique to each 
parcel owner, the trial process could easily get mired in technical 
evidentiary issues that in turn can encourage appeals, which 
would seriously delay the compensation determination.78  In short, 
if compensation were to include idiosyncratic value, the jury proc-
ess might compromise efficient Kelo takings by adding administra-
tive and risk costs, or perhaps even inflating just compensation 
awards beyond the actual harm to the property owner such that 
the alternative mechanisms for aggregating parcels of property 
would be less costly.  
Therefore, when the right to a jury trial is provided by statute, 
the state legislature should override that provision and create a 
special state-wide board to determine idiosyncratic value for Kelo 
takings.  Boards can use less formal fact-finding procedures than 
jury trials, and can develop expertise in evaluating the kinds of 
evidence parcel owners are likely to present of idiosyncratic value.  
Such evidence can be put in various categories about which the 
board can develop expertise.  For example, opportunity costs of 
having to move and subjective attachment to the property would 
seem to include most of the types of evidence that parcel owners 
might claim contribute to idiosyncratic value above market 
value.79   
The opportunity cost issue boils down to determining the cost 
of obtaining other land that is at least as good from the perspective 
of the initial landowner.  For example, the parcel owner might be a 
resident who offers evidence that she has a job in the local area 
and little ability to obtain a job paying a similar amount else-
where.  Idiosyncratic value would then include the lesser of the 
cost of obtaining other adequate housing in the local area or the 
 
 78.  Over time, as the board creates precedents for idiosyncratic value determinations, 
the process may be sufficiently efficient that it might even cost less than jury trials to de-
termine market value and hence might lower the present administrative costs of just com-
pensation. 
 79.  Nicolle Garnett summarizes the components of subjective value that would not be 
compensated by market value.  In addition to objective idiosyncratic and psychological 
value, she includes a premium due to the endowment effect and dignitary harms from the 
fear that the government will force homeowners from their property.  See Garnett, supra 
note 71, at 107-10.  Both of these can be taken into account by decisionmakers setting sub-
jective value of the taken property if the decisionmakers deem them legitimate constituents 
of such value.    
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lost wages from having to take another job.  Subjective attachment 
would cover any unique psychological attachment to the land.  For 
example, if a land owner’s family owned a house for four genera-
tions, and that particular owner had lived there for seventy years, 
one could reasonably conclude that the owner would have more 
attachment than if the owner was a landlord who rented to ten-
ants who generally moved in and out every year or two.  Because 
the types of evidence parcel owners might present would tend to be 
of the same type, over time, a board could develop expertise and 
precedent that would render the idiosyncratic value determina-
tions more transparent (and therefore accountable) and more pre-
dictable.   
Legislators may not be able to eliminate the right to jury de-
termination of just compensation where that right is provided by 
the state constitution.  In addition, even if the legislature can 
eliminate the role of the jury by statute, legislators may be con-
cerned that property owners will feel slighted in the Kelo context if 
they are deprived of this right.  It would be perverse if legislation 
meant to protect property owners from abuses of eminent domain 
power was perceived as depriving the owners of the right to get 
their valuation claims heard by a jury.  One way out of this conun-
drum may be for the legislature to offer a parcel owner whose land 
is taken under the Kelo power the alternative of getting idiosyn-
cratic value rather than market value for his property, if he is will-
ing to waive his right to a jury trial.  Because market value is nec-
essarily lower than idiosyncratic value, many parcel owners would 
have an incentive to accept this alternative.  Most significantly, 
those who believe that their idiosyncratic value is significantly 
greater than market value would be most apt to accept the alter-
native, and for the others, use of market value will be sufficiently 
close to their actual value that we need not worry about the ineffi-
ciencies and unfairness caused by use of market value. 
One further objection to my proposal for just compensation is 
that it would deprive owners of the value that they could have de-
rived from a private sale of the property.  Usually when a person 
sells property, the seller and buyer divide any surplus from the 
transfer of ownership as part of their agreement.80  That is what 
 
 80.  See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
957, 965-66 (2004).  Two scholars recently proposed giving original parcel owners a choice 
between fair market value and a share in the project for which their land is taken as a way 
of giving the initial owners their expectation in the surplus that might be derived from sale. 
Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704, 1734-35 
(2007).  I question whether initial owners are entitled to that expectation in the context 
where use of the Kelo power is warranted and therefore they could not otherwise have ob-
tained any of the value that results from aggregation of parcels.  I would also note that, 
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makes a private sale a wealth-increasing transaction.  My position 
is predicated on the assumption that neither the original nor the 
ultimate private owner of property taken by the Kelo power is enti-
tled to surplus from the transfer that does not derive from their 
unique abilities to put the property to a highest valuing use.  In 
essence, if the transfer is wealth-increasing but would not come 
about by private transactions, because of strategic behavior or 
other transaction costs that only use of eminent domain can over-
come, the government, as enabler of the transfer, deserves the 
surplus.   The original owner cannot have a reasonable expectation 
in getting the value that results from aggregation of his parcel 
with others if that aggregation cannot occur but for the use of emi-
nent domain.  Moreover, if local government action is necessary for 
a wealth-maximizing transfer, we want to give the government an 
incentive to take that action.   
 
B. “Auctioning” Kelo Property 
 
The second problem with the Kelo power, as it is currently ex-
ercised, is the ability of government to transfer land to political 
supporters or other friends.  This encourages rent seeking and for-
feits the synergistic values that the government creates by use of 
eminent domain.81  In order to retain this value, the government 
needs to harness the incentives of other potential recipients of the 
property.  In other words, the local government should essentially 
be required to auction the condemned land to the highest bidder, 
thereby capturing any value from the conglomeration of the indi-
vidual parcels that is not unique to the ultimate recipient for itself. 
One might counter that the payoff to private entities who ob-
tain property after a local government exercises its Kelo power 
provides a needed incentive to private entities to identify potential 
sites for projects that can result in wealth-maximizing property 
aggregation.  That argument is analogous to those of corporate law 
 
even if I did think that initial owners were entitled to that expectation, at least in the resi-
dential setting (which is the most troublesome), I doubt that many landowners would choose 
Lehavi and Licht’s option to invest in the project rather than taking a certain sum that they 
could use to purchase a replacement for their residence. 
 81.  For this reason, several scholars have invoked public choice theory and political 
realism to argue that use of the Kelo power cannot be constrained adequately by the politi-
cal process even with more transparent procedures.  See Somin, supra note 37, at 210-13 
(using a public choice analysis); Garnett, supra note 71, at 110-17 (noting, in the context of 
discussing use of eminent domain to build Chicago’s expressways, the realities that political 
power depends on attachment to cohesive communities and other connections).   These 
scholars, however, ignore the potential of harnessing other private entities with significant 
interests in the property to highlight uncertainties and inefficiencies of a proposed use of 
the Kelo power.   
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scholars against allowing targets to hold auctions following tender 
offers.82   In the context of Kelo takings, however, entrepreneurial 
companies are not as likely to have the capability to identify op-
portunities to create synergistic property value as corporate raid-
ers are to have the ability to identify opportunities for creating 
value by taking over other corporations and replacing their man-
agers.  The information about land values and uses is much more 
public than information about corporate operations.  Hence, the 
opportunities for creating such value will often be recognized by 
many people, and there will be less need and less return from en-
gaging in identifying such opportunities.   
If there is a situation involving non-public information about 
the potential uses of contiguous land parcels, that information will 
most likely be known to local government officials who may know 
and control plans for changing land uses around the parcels.  Local 
government officials thus are analogous to the original managers 
of the corporation:  they have much of the information needed to 
determine whether a change in control of the property would be 
wealth-maximizing.  Essentially, they can do much to prevent any 
aggregation going forward, both by declining to exercise the Kelo 
power and by zoning of the affected property.  Unlike the corporate 
context, however, local officials do not lose their jobs if the transfer 
occurs.  In fact, they have incentives to facilitate wealth-increasing 
transfers to increase revenues to the city, either from increased 
taxable property values or from direct payments from Kelo prop-
erty recipients.  Hence, unlike the corporate takeover context, local 
officials have the means and incentive to identify sites for which 
property aggregation will lead to wealth increases.83
A more significant problem for constraining abuses of the 
wealth transfer in the Kelo context is the actual mechanism by 
which an appropriate auction can be conducted.  In most cases, 
justification of a project depends on external benefits that accrue 
 
 82.  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1177-79 (1981) (argu-
ing against auctions for corporate takeovers because they transfer surplus from initial offer-
ers to target shareholders, thereby eliminating incentives for offerers to identify under-
priced corporations); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2  J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 229, 236-38 (1986) (auctions in the corporate takeover market decrease the 
search for undervalued corporations).   
 83.  Local government officials, however, do have an incentive to transfer the surplus 
from the land transfer to those who will best serve the officials’ personal interest.  In this 
sense, while we can expect officials to look for opportunities for such land transfer, we can-
not trust them to maximize the benefit to the public they serve.  In such situations, local 
officials are analogous to “unfaithful” corporate managers, and auctions are an appropriate 
means of reducing the agency costs between such managers and the body to which they owe 
a duty of loyalty.  See Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform 
Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27, 35-36 (1991). 
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to the local population and the local governmental entity.  Hence, 
the value of the project to the putative bidder, the potential prop-
erty transferee, will not reflect the entire social value of the pro-
ject.  A straightforward auction will not work because the use that 
maximizes value to the bidder may not maximize the net social 
value of the tract, or even the value that the local government de-
rives from exercising the Kelo power.84  
Whatever process a local entity is required to use to exercise 
the Kelo power, like an auction, it should be structured to strip 
away value that does not derive from unique attributes of the sub-
sequent owner, leaving the synergistic value of aggregation cap-
tured by the local government.  Essentially, the process should in-
corporate competition between private bidders for a Kelo project.  
Perhaps the best process to promote competition from private bid-
ders would require a local government to announce proposed pro-
jects in advance, and to allow any interested entities (including 
other potential users of the land) to file comments supporting, op-
posing, or suggesting alternatives to the project.  This will permit 
initially identified recipient competitors to propose their own pro-
jects and to submit evidence that their projects will provide more 
benefit to the local community than the project initially proposed.  
The process should mandate that the local government justify the 
project it chooses as the one that maximizes the value to the citi-
zens of the municipality.  By analogy to notice and comment rule-
making, the process should mandate either judicial or administra-
tive review of the agency reasons for its choice that defers to the 
ultimate facts found and evaluations made by the local govern-
ment, but demands a connection of those facts to the record and a 
thorough explanation of how the local government reached its de-
cision.85  
The requirement that local government justify its decision as 
one that maximizes value to its citizens would also alleviate the 
problem, in many cases, that the private entity for whom the land 
is taken never follows through with development of the land.  Con-
sideration of whether a planned project will provide the requisite 
 
 84.  Lehavi and Licht, like I, also envision some process that auctions the land to the 
highest value owner.  Lehavi & Licht, supra note 80, 1734.  These authors, however, envi-
sion an actual auction conducted by a “special purpose development corporation” to whom 
the local government would transfer the land after it is condemned.  As I explain, an actual 
auction is problematic because the value of the property after transfer may be composed 
significantly of external benefits from the new use, and a private entity will not be willing to 
include these benefits in its bids.   
 85.  As I have written elsewhere, the review process of agency reasoning provides 
salutary benefits of ferreting out agency dishonesty and inducing care in the agency deci-
sion-making process.  See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, 
and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002). 
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public benefits necessarily takes into account the probability that 
those benefits do not materialize.  A public process in which sev-
eral entities compete for the land will give each an incentive to 
monitor the reliability of the others’ assertions about public bene-
fits that will accrue from their proposals.  Moreover, a private en-
tity that truly believes it will provide public benefits can guaranty 
such benefits, perhaps in the form of a surety bond that agrees to 
pay the local government if a property recipient fails to deliver on 




The Kelo case generated an enormous public outcry about the 
potential impact of local government use of eminent domain be-
cause, in that case, the City of New London seemed to rob from the 
poor residents whose property was taken to give to the rich and 
well connected Pfizer Company.  Many hoped that the Supreme 
Court would play the role of Robin Hood and stop the abuses by 
modern day Sheriffs of Nottingham—local governments seeking to 
increase their tax base.  Instead, the Court reaffirmed that taking 
of property to transfer it from one set of private entities to another 
is not constitutionally improper, and thereby left it to state legisla-
tures to be Robin Hood in the modern analog to the classic tale.    
I have suggested that the best way for legislatures to play this 
role is to pass statutes entitling landowners to idiosyncratic value 
as compensation for property taken for redevelopment and require 
governments to employ a process that invites competing bids for 
the land at issue, subject to judicial review, thereby forcing the 
government to justify its ultimate decision to take the property 
and transfer it to its new private owner.  The problems of deter-
mining idiosyncratic value are not so great that a state-wide board 
could not develop both expertise and a list of factors, making the 
determination both rational and predictable.  In addition, competi-
tion for use of land that a local government condemns, with the 
intent to transfer it to a private entity, can constrain the use of 
eminent domain so that the benefit of aggregating parcels of land 
to allow a more valuable use flows to the jurisdiction that exercises 
the eminent domain power, rather than to those who are simply 
politically powerful and well connected.  
 
